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This paper concerns itself with the metaphysics of free will. To posit, as some philosophers do, that free 
will and determinism are incompatible is to provide a necessary condition for free will. Yet what should 
a sufficient condition look like? In other words, how might indeterminists provide a positive account of 
free will? In section 2 of this paper, I provide a few definitions and discuss an influential argument 
against compatibilism, namely the view that free will and determinism are compatible. This will help to 
identify some important criteria for theories of free will. Section 3 shows how abandoning determinism 
and adopting indeterminism is also problematic, and that we thus need to fill in the definition of free will. 
Section 4 presents the first part of Robert Kane’s definition of free will, which goes along the lines of 
“we make choices based on our beliefs, priorities, etc.” and section 5 offers Kane’s account of Self-
Forming Actions to explain how our beliefs and priorities are our own. The core of my objection will 
take place in section 6, where I show how the concept of a Self-Forming Action cannot make free will 








Some philosophers believe that free will and determinism are incompatible. To do so is 
to provide a necessary (but surely not sufficient) condition for free will. Yet naturally 
the question arises: what should a sufficient condition look like? In other words, how 
might indeterminists provide a positive account of free will? Robert Kane has proposed 
an answer: put roughly, we are free if at least some of our choices result from 
indeterministic processes in which the indeterminism is, in the right sense, ultimately 
up to us. In this paper, I provide an objection to Kane’s solution. 
 
The plan for this paper is as follows. In section 2, I will provide a few definitions and 
discuss an influential argument against compatibilism, namely the view that free will 
and determinism are compatible. This will help us to identify some important criteria 
for theories of free will. In section 3, I show how simply abandoning determinism and 
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adopting indeterminism is also problematic, and that we thus need to fill in the 
definition of free will. Section 4 presents the first part of Kane’s definition of free will, 
which goes along the lines of “we make choices based on our beliefs, priorities, etc.” 
and section 5 offers Kane’s account of Self-Forming Actions to explain how our beliefs 
and priorities are our own. The core of my objection will take place in section 6, where 
I show how the concept of a Self-Forming Action cannot make free will compatible 
with indeterminism in that the idea of a Self-Forming Action is incoherent. 
 
2. Definitions and the Argument Against Determinism 
 
Whereas many might intuitively agree to statements of the sort “the future is open” and 
“I have free will,” there exists much debate about such readily accepted declarations. 
For example, determinism posits that our present actions are necessary consequences of 
the past and the laws of nature and that since there is nothing that can be done to 
change either the past or the laws of nature, nothing can be done to change our present 
actions. Those who accept determinism and the existence of free will are referred to as 
“compatibilists”. Those who accept determinism and reject the existence of free will are 
“hard determinists”. Finally, people of the sort originally mentioned, who reject 
determinism (who are indeterminists) and accept free will are called “libertarians”. 
Libertarians and hard determinists can also be suitably referred to as “incompatibilists” 
in that they maintain that free will and determinism are inherently contradictory and 
thus incompatible with one another. 
 
A typical way for the incompatibilist to argue for their theory is to derive a 
contradiction from the existence of both free will and determinism. A notable 
incompatibilist objection to compatibilism is of the sort: 
 
(1) If we have free will, then we are the origins of our choices.. 
(2) If determinism is true, then events outside of us (i.e. the initial conditions 
of the universe and the laws of nature) are the origins of our choices. 
(3) If our actions are caused by events outside of us (i.e. the initial conditions 
of the universe and the laws of nature), then we are not the origins of our 
choices. 
(4) If determinism is true, then we are not the origins of our choices. 
(5) If determinism is true, then we do not have free will. 
 
It would appear as if an argument of this sort poses quite a problem for the 
compatibilist. The syllogism itself is valid, so if one were to want to debate the 
soundness of the argument, one ought to question the truth of the premises. The 
compatibilist obviously could not question (2); it is a basic definition of determinism. 
Nor could he or she argue with (3); it is virtually self-evident. Therefore, it behooves us 
to investigate premise (1).  
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There are two reasons that premise (1) is of interest to this paper, First and foremost, 
we notice that (1) fails to provide us with a definition of free will; it just provides a 
necessary condition for free will (namely, us being the origins of our choices). 
Consequently, even if the libertarian were to favor this argument, it falls short of 
constituting an argument for libertarianism. As such, the libertarian needs to fill in the 
definition of free will, something that Robert Kane attempts to do and that will be more 
thoroughly discussed in section 4 of this paper. 
 
Secondly, although the argument falls short of providing us with a definition of free 
will, it does succeed in conveying something nonetheless interesting about free will: 
namely, that free will is connected in some way to us being the origins of our choices. 
Taking note of this now will prove fruitful later on as I use this point to object to 
Kane’s definition of free will. 
 
3. Abandoning Determinism 
 
However, it is not enough to simply abandon determinism and adopt indeterminism. 
The libertarian needs provide a definition of free will (i.e. it is not enough to simply 
supply a necessary condition of free will; a sufficient one is needed). Suppose I live in 
an indeterministic world and decide to stop writing this paper and go for a run, where 
this decision is thus due to indeterministic and causal processes outside of my control. 
My decision to do so would be the first event in the causal chain of my performing this 
action (where subsequent events might be closing my laptop, getting my sneakers, 
going outside, etc.). However, if the definition of free will given above is correct, then I 
am the origin of my choices and nothing outside of my control has caused me to make 
this choice. Consequently, the link between my decision and my beginning to perform 
these movements is not causally determined, which is to say it is not necessitated by 
certain antecedent events in combination with the laws. Thus we encounter a problem 
regarding how it is that my decision could have had any impact whatsoever on my 
actions, and my performing a series of actions must subsequently be the consequence of 
chance. If it is the case that my actions are the consequence of either chance or luck, 
then it is hardly the case that I am the ultimate cause of my choices. Thus, simply 
positing indeterminism in the stead of determinism simply leads to additional problems 
regarding free will. It would appear as if we need a more in depth analysis of free will if 
we do not want to give up on its existence. 
 
4. Kane’s Theory of Free Will (Part 1) 
 
Robert Kane attempts to provide us with this extra bit of analysis, defending the 
viability of libertarianism by accounting for free will in such a way that it becomes 
inseparable from indeterminism. Kane makes five points in trying to supply this 
account: 
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(1) We can cause indeterministic events. That is to say that when we intend to 
do something with the knowledge that this action will probably result in a 
consequent, then we are responsible for this consequent if it happens 
(Kane 293-294) 
 
For example, let us say that I am going to drop a glass of milk with the intention that 
the glass breaks. Let us now say that I accomplish this goal. Kane argues that we would 
say that I am responsible for having shattered the glass even though whether or not it 
would shatter was indeterministic. As the indeterminism arises from matters of fact 
about the glass itself, there is thus a sense that my action was both up to me in a very 
important sense and up to chance (Kane 294). 
 
(2) Our brains are parallel processors (Kane 294) 
 
This is to say that we are capable of having two processes going on in our head at the 
simultaneously, such as wanting two things at once. The example given by Kane is that 
of a businesswoman, running late for a meeting when she sees someone being 
assaulted. Here, her brain is working as a parallel processor in that she experiencing 
two simultaneous and conflicting desires (the desire to make her meeting and the desire 
to stop the assault) at the same time. 
 
(3) In special deliberative processes, your mental processes are “pushing in 
opposite directions” (Kane 294-295). 
 
This is simply to say that one would be willing to do either thing in these sorts of 
deliberative processes (e.g. either get to the meeting on time or stop the assault). 
 
(4) It is ultimately indeterministic which option in the deliberative process 
wins out (Kane 295). 
 
This is an interesting point that takes us back to the example of my dropping a glass of 
milk. In that case, the indeterminism of my action arose from facts about the glass 
itself. In the example of the businesswoman, the indeterminism arises from her 
willingness to do either thing. 
 
(5) Probability is apportioned to the relative strength of will (Kane 295-296). 
 
In the case of the business woman, the probability that she will make it to her 
meeting on time and let the assault take place has to do with which decision lies in 
accordance with her will. If her will to make it to the meeting in a timely manner is 
stronger than that of her will to help the victim, it is much more probable that she 
will choose that route. 
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Therefore, whichever choice the businesswoman makes, she has caused it as a part 
of her was willing it; the source of the indeterminism comes from the different 
features of her will. One ought to think of the effort–where the “effort” is our wills 
struggling against one another–and the indeterminism of the choice as fused. 
Subsequently, it would not appear to be unreasonable for Kane to conclude that free 
will is compatible with indeterminism, having provided us with a sufficient 
condition for possessing free will. 
 
5. Kane’s Theory of Free Will (Part 2) 
 
Kane's explanation of what it is to make a choice seems to amount to “we make choices 
based on our beliefs, priorities, etc.” These reasons–that is to say these beliefs and 
priorities–result in what Kane calls the “effort”. So we end up in a situation where Kane 
has claimed that our choices arise from our reasons. To continue using the example of 
the businesswoman, an essential question to ask would then be: from where did her 
reasons arise? Why did she have the desires, dispositions, etc? Was that up to her? We 
find ourselves in nearly the exact same situation we were when Kane began his 
argument; we are still debating whether or not the causes of our choices are determined 
or undetermined. It would appear as if Kane’s argument has done little to convince us 
of free will’s compatibility with indeterminism. 
 
However, Kane recognizes this problem in his argument and responds to it 
appropriately with a description of what he calls “Self-Forming Actions” (SFAs). SFAs 
are moments of indecision, as mentioned above, in which our wills are in conflict with 
each other and we use reasoning to come to a decision (Kane 296). The SFAs are the 
sources of our beliefs and priorities. For example, let us say that I always give money to 
charity. This sort of action is commendable in the sense that it is something that I have 
cultivated; I am responsible for forming this kind of character. For at some point or 
another, my mind was working as a parallel processor, having two desires going on in 
my head at the same time; namely, my want to give to charity versus my want to keep 
my money (Point 2). Additionally, when I was making this decision, I was willing to do 
either thing (Points 3 and 4). Ultimately, I decided to give to charity, for my desire to 
give to charity and be a charitable person was greater than my wanting to keep my 
money for myself (Point 5). 
 
Kane posits that this sort of “ultimate responsibility” for my actions (even once they are 
habituated and can be referred to as determined1) arises from the moment in which I 
encountered an SFA; in other words, SFAs are necessary for having ultimate 
responsibility over one’s actions. However, if you are a compatibilist, Kane claims that 
                                                          
1 For Kane, it is not necessary that every decision we make is undetermined but only that 
decisions regarding SFAs are. 
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you would be faced with an infinite regress that strips you of ultimate responsibility. In 
that all of your actions and reasoning behind them are necessarily determined, there is a 
sense that neither your dispositions nor your choices were ever really “up to you” and 
you consequently do not bear responsibility for your actions. Thus, SFAs operate as 
indeterministic regress-stoppers that are necessary for ultimate responsibility; SFAs 
require a more robust sense of choice than compatibilism allows for in that it is 
necessary that my decision is not determined. Consequently, if I never really made the 
sort of choice that Kane talks about, then there is no ultimate responsibility for my 
actions. Obviously it is problematic for us to accept that there is no sort of ultimate 
responsibility for our actions (our entire legal system would fall apart), so it would 
behoove us to accept the existence of SFAs. Consequently, Kane rejects the 
compatibilist view of free will, as there must be instances in which we make 
undetermined choices. 
 
6. Objection to Kane’s Theory 
 
I will now argue that Kane’s descriptions of free will and SFAs do not adequately 
answer the question of how we are responsible for our actions (that is to say, how we 
bear ultimate responsibility). A problem seems to arise when we consider someone 
deliberating for the first time. For the sake of this thought experiment sounding more 
reasonable to us, let us say that this person is a child. The child has not yet cultivated 
her own disposition but has instead just been “given” dispositions by her surroundings 
(for instance, her parents, teachers, books she might have been read, etc. are all 
currently responsible for her disposition). She is not yet ultimately responsible for her 
actions. However, Kane would say that after this SFA, she will bear 
ultimate responsibility. So after this first deliberation, in which her mind is working as 
a parallel processor and pushing in different directions (Points 2 and 3), she will 
become responsible for her choices in that she has succeeded in cultivating her own 
disposition (or at least a part of it). However, if she is not currently responsible for her 
dispositions, is she responsible for her reasoning? I would say no. Given the kinds of 
beings that we are, our dispositions strongly affect the kinds of reasoning we do, the 
kinds of conclusions that we draw and the decisions that we subsequently make. In 
other words, our reasoning results from our dispositions. Yet if the child in question has 
been given her dispositions by external factors, she has also been given her reasoning. 
Thus, the “strength of her will” (Point 5) that ultimately determines the probability of 
her decision has been supplied to her and the decision was not “up to her” in the 
significant sort of way that Kane requires. It would appear as if there is no way to 
escape her reasoning being governed by external factors. 
 
This is an objection to which I cannot find a solution. I have focused on the very first 
SFA because insofar as they are necessary for ultimate responsibility, it follows that if 
we cannot even have our first SFA, then we fail to have any sort of ultimate 
responsibility. Having made the point that we do not have responsibility for our 
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dispositions prior to our first SFA, it follows that we lack responsibility for our 
reasoning while deliberating over the SFA. It is thus impossible for that SFA to actually 
be an SFA in that we are not responsible for its outcome (i.e. the decision that we 
make) and the very idea of an SFA proves to be incoherent. As such, it would appear as 
if we do not have ultimate responsibility for our actions or, if we do, it cannot be by 




I have presented the varying stances regarding free will and the determined or 
undetermined nature of our world–compatibilism and incompatibilism (more 
specifically, libertarianism and hard determinism). The incompatibilist traditionally 
tries to argue against compatibilism by showing how determinism and free will are 
incompatible with one another. Unfortunately for the libertarian, all this argument 
succeeds in doing is showing that free will is incompatible with both a determined and 
an undetermined universe. However, Robert Kane gives an account of free will in such 
a way that free will manages to exist in an indeterministic world. Yet, as is the case in 
his account, if our choices arise from our reasons, then from where do our reasons 
arise? According to Kane, our reasons emerge from Self Forming Actions, in which the 
decisions we make form our characters and allow us to bear ultimate responsibility for 
our actions. However, in the way I have problematized his theory, it would appear that 
there is no way for one’s reasoning to not be governed by external sources. Thus, we 
are left with a conclusion that would intuitively trouble most. I have already discussed 
that we are not responsible for the kind of individuals we are; that is determined by 
external factors. Since our actions arise from the kind of person that we are and 
ultimate responsibility over our actions entails being responsible for the kind of person 
we are, then it would appear as if we are not ultimately responsible for our actions. 
Therefore, Kane’s account fails to provide a sufficient condition for the possession of 
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